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News About the Future and
Economic Fluctuations*
n the late 1990s, as tech-stock prices were 
surging, we often heard discussion about 
a “new economy” in which advanced 
communications technologies would lead to 
higher future productivity growth and greater economic 
efficiency. But the boom times largely came to a halt after 
August 2000, and in March 2001, the economy entered 
a recession that lasted eight months. Economist A.C. 
Pigou argued that news about the future or changes in 
expectations are important drivers of the business cycle. 
His theory seems to offer a plausible explanation of what 
happens in boom-bust cycles. But is his theory consistent 
with how modern macroeconomic models account for 
business cycles? In this article, Keith Sill investigates some 
of the empirical evidence for the economic importance 
of news shocks, discusses the failings of the standard 
macroeconomic model in accounting for the role of news 
in business cycles, and touches on what the news view of 
business cycles means for the conduct of monetary policy.
Our expectations about how the 
future will unfold can have important 
implications for the choices we make 
today.  An expectation of future 
*The views expressed here are those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System.
unemployment might result in reduced 
consumption and higher savings 
today. Or an expectation of a future 
promotion and higher salary may 
induce higher consumption and lower 
saving today, even before the higher 
salary is realized. This rather obvious 
feature of individual behavior may 
have important implications for the 
economy as a whole.  Macroeconomic 
aggregate variables such as 
consumption and investment could 
rise in response to a collective belief 
that the economy will experience 
higher productivity in the future. 
A recent example of how 
collective beliefs can influence 
economic variables is the dot-com 
boom and bust of the late 1990s. In 
the late 1990s, as tech-stock prices 
were surging, we often heard discussion 
about an impending “new economy” 
in which advanced Internet and 
communications technologies would 
lead to higher future productivity 
growth and greater economic 
efficiency.  We could argue that those 
collective beliefs about the future 
became embedded in stock prices 
and led to dramatic gains in the 
equity prices of technology-related 
companies. In turn, higher stock 
prices made households feel wealthier, 
which induced increased consumption. 
Businesses began investing in the 
emerging technologies in the hopes of 
generating higher future profits.
These boom times, seemingly 
driven at least in part by overly 
optimistic expectations about 
the future, largely came to a halt 
after August 2000. After the fact, 
expectations proved to be optimistic. 
Over the next three years, the stock 
market declined on the order of 40 
plus percent. In March 2001, the 
economy entered a recession that 
lasted eight months. The level of real 
private nonresidential fixed investment 
(business fixed investment) declined 
16 percent from the fourth quarter of 
2000 to the first quarter of 2003. The 
boom was followed by a bust.  Business Review  Q4  2009   23 www.philadelphiafed.org
1 For our purposes, a shock can be thought of as 
the difference between a predicted outcome and 
the actual outcome. 
In 1927, A.C. Pigou, an economics 
professor at Cambridge University who 
studied business cycles, wrote a book 
called Industrial Fluctuations. In that 
book, Pigou argued that news about 
the future or changes in consumers’ 
and businesses’ expectations are 
important drivers of the business 
cycle and economic fluctuations.  In 
particular, when firms and suppliers 
of capital are optimistic about the 
future, they decide to invest more 
today in order to accumulate capital to 
meet higher expected future demand. 
If it turns out that expectations are 
overly optimistic, firms pull back on 
investment and consumers retrench, 
leading to an economic downturn or 
recession. 
This seems to be a plausible 
explanation of what happens in boom-
bust cycles like the dot-com episode. 
But do the data really support this 
story, and are Pigou cycles pervasive 
features of modern economies? 
Also, is Pigou’s theory consistent 
with how modern macroeconomic 
models account for business cycles? 
An emerging body of empirical 
evidence supports the view that news 
about the future is an important 
factor in explaining fluctuations in 
output and employment. However, 
the standard workhorse model used 
by macroeconomists predicts that 
good news about the future leads 
to what looks a lot like a recession 
today! If good news about the future 
results in booms today, the standard 
macroeconomic model needs some 
modification if it is to explain such 
behavior. 
We will investigate some of the 
empirical evidence for the economic 
importance of news shocks and how 
they affect the economy. We will also 
discuss the failings of the standard 
macroeconomic model when it comes 
to accounting for the role of news 
in business cycles. A recent line 
of research explores this issue and 
examines the features necessary to get 
models to predict booms in response to 
good news about the future economy. 
Finally, we will touch on what the 
news view of business cycles means for 
the conduct of monetary policy. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
ON EXPECTATIONS AND 
FLUCTUATIONS
Is there any hard evidence that 
changes in expectations about the 
future lead to significantly large 
changes in economic activity today? 
The key problem that must be 
addressed when deciding whether 
news about the future affects the 
economy is separating the scenario 
“economic booms lead to changes 
in expectations” from the scenario 
“changes in expectations lead to 
economic booms.” That is, we have 
to account for the fact that changes 
in current economic activity also give 
rise to changes in expectations about 
the future economy. Once we control 
for that possibility, we can investigate 
the extent to which changes in 
expectations can drive economic 
fluctuations. 
A recent paper by Paul Beaudry 
and Franck Portier provides some 
evidence of the importance of news 
about the future to fluctuations 
in economic variables such as 
consumption and hours worked.  
Beaudry and Portier undertake 
a statistical analysis of data on 
productivity and stock market prices 
to investigate this question. The 
stock market is a key component of 
the analysis because it is generally 
perceived to be forward-looking in the 
sense that news that people receive 
about future prospects for the economy 
should be reflected right away in stock 
prices, since participants trade on that 
information.   
Beaudry and Portier are able to 
tease shocks out of the data on stock 
prices and productivity that give 
insight into how expectations about 
the future affect today’s economy.1 
They find that their shocks contain 
information about future productivity 
growth that is also reflected in 
current stock prices. In addition, 
they find that long-run changes in 
productivity are reflected in stock 
prices before these changes show 
up in near-term productivity. These 
findings are consistent with the view 
that financial market participants can 
anticipate productivity improvements, 
perhaps because there is a long delay 
between receiving news about a new 
productivity-enhancing technology 
and the realization of higher 
productivity once the technology is 
implemented. Beaudry and Portier call 
this the “news view.”
We can interpret the shocks 
that Beaudry and Portier identify 
as news shocks because they 
represent unpredicted or unexpected 
information that shows up in 
productivity and stock prices. This 
Is there any hard evidence that changes 
in expectations about the future 
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is what news is: information that 
wasn’t previously available that tells us 
something about final outcomes.
With news shocks in hand, we 
can now investigate whether changes 
in news about the future have an 
impact on current variables such as 
consumption, investment, and hours 
worked.  Figure 1 shows how stock 
prices, per capita consumption, and 
hours worked per capita respond to 
a positive news shock. The figure 
shows the response of these variables 
over time to two different measures 
of the news shock, though we see 
that it makes little difference which 
shock we focus on, since they both 
imply the same paths for stock prices, 
consumption, and hours worked. If 
there were no response to the news 
shocks, the lines in the figure for stock 
prices, consumption, and hours would 
stay near zero. What we see instead 
is that stock prices, consumption, 
and hours worked all jump up right 
away in response to positive news. 
Consumption and hours worked 
continue to rise for about five quarters 
and then give up some of their gains 
in apparent recession-like behavior. 
Eventually, consumption resumes its 
general upward trend. Hours worked 
flatten out because hours per capita 
tend not to rise over time. (People 
do not work more and more hours as 
productivity increases — leisure is 
valuable, too!)  
Beaudry and Portier also 
investigate how much of the variation 
in consumption and hours worked 
can be explained by their identified 
news shocks.2 This is a measure of how 
economically important such shocks 
might be. They find that news shocks 
Response of Stock Prices, Consumption, and 
Hours Worked to Two Measures of Positive News 
About the Future
FIGURE 1
From Beaudry & Portier (2006).  Used with permission. Dotted gray lines indicate 95 percent
confidence interval
2 More precisely, they compute how much of 
the variance of forecast errors for consumption, 
hours, and investment can be explained 
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account for 40 to 80 percent of the 
variation in consumption, investment, 
and hours worked over the postwar 
period. This is a huge number and 
suggests that news about the future 
may be an important determinant of 
the economy’s fluctuations.
A second piece of evidence on 
the importance of news shocks for 
economic fluctuations can be found 
in recent research I conducted with 
Sylvain Leduc. We use data from 
the Philadelphia Fed’s Livingston 
Survey and the Survey of Professional 
Forecasters (SPF) to identify news 
shocks and to assess their effect on 
variables such as the unemployment 
rate, stock prices, and inflation. Both 
the Livingston and the SPF are surveys 
of professional forecasters who are 
asked to make forecasts of a range 
of macroeconomic variables. The 
Philadelphia Fed then tabulates and 
publishes the forecasts.3
Survey data give us a unique 
insight into expectations of the future, 
since they are a direct measure of such 
expectations. Since we know the time 
at which the surveys are conducted, 
we can use that information to help 
us identify news shocks. That is, 
broadly speaking, we know which 
realizations of economic variables the 
forecasters already knew or had in 
hand when they made their forecasts. 
So forecasters for a June survey would 
know May unemployment rates but not 
June unemployment rates, since those 
data would not have been released yet. 
We can use that type of information to 
identify news shocks and assess their 
impact on economic variables. More 
specifically, we analyze a statistical 
model that contains forecasts of 
future unemployment rates, current 
unemployment rates, interest rates, 
and inflation. We align the data in 
such a way as to help us identify shocks 
to forecasts of future unemployment 
that are not driven by the other 
variables in the system. We interpret 
these shocks as news about the future 
that changes people’s expectations 
because the shocks are the difference 
between what we expect the predicted 
unemployment rate to be and what the 
prediction actually turns out to be.  In 
this context, a positive shock is bad 
news because it implies that forecasts 
of future unemployment rates were 
higher than we would have predicted 
them to be.   
Once we have these news shocks, 
we can examine how they affect the 
other variables in the model, such as 
the unemployment rate, CPI inflation, 
and interest rates.4 Figure 2 presents 
a set of responses from such a shock. 
The two columns from the figure 
show which survey measure was used 
in the model: The left side shows the 
Livingston Survey and the right side, 
the Survey of Professional Forecasters. 
Each row represents the response of a 
different variable to a news shock that 
decreases the expected unemployment 
rate (what economists call impulse 
responses).  The top row of the figure 
shows how forecasts of six-month-
ahead unemployment rates evolve 
when there is a news shock that leads 
forecasters to expect lower future 
unemployment.  The second row shows 
how actual, or current, unemployment 
responds to the shock. We see that 
the unemployment rate falls, so that 
in response to expectations of future 
bad times, current times turn better.  
The third row shows the response of 
inflation to the news shock. Consistent 
with the current upturn story, near-
term inflation rises. The next row 
shows the response of stock returns, 
measured using the S&P 500, to the 
news shock. Here we see that when 
news about expected good times 
arrives, the current stock market rises. 
Finally, the last row shows the response 
of short-term interest rates to the news 
shock. Here, we see that monetary 
policy tightens as the economy booms 
in the near term in response to the 
good news shock.  
The impulse responses in Figure 
2 suggest that the current economy 
surges when the future economy is 
expected to be better. But how strong 
are the results? Plotted around the 
impulse responses are confidence 
bands that indicate how sure we 
are that a response is different from 
zero. We see from the figure that 
the responses of all the variables 
are significantly different from zero.  
To further assess the strength of 
the results, we performed variance 
decompositions similar to those in the 
Beaudry and Portier paper described 
above. We find that about 50 percent 
of the variability of forecast errors for 
our variables can be explained by news 
shocks, a result that is in line with the 
findings in Beaudry and Portier. So, in 
3 A description of the surveys and survey data 
are available on the Philadelphia Fed’s website 
at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-
data/real-time-center/.
4 We chose these variables because they are not 
generally subject to data revisions over time. 
Survey data give us a unique insight into 
expectations of the future, since they are 
a direct measure of such expectations.26   Q4  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
FIGURE 2
The responses were generated from a VAR with expected unemployment percent, actual unemployment, inflation, equity prices, the 10-year T-bill 
rate, the 3-month T-bill rate, and dummy variables for oil and fiscal shocks. All of the responses are expressed in percentage terms. The x-axis 
denotes years. In each chart, the darker area represents the 68 percent confidence interval, while the sum of the darker and lighter areas denotes the 
90 percent confidence interval.
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sum, we find that the economy surges 
in response to expectations of better 
times ahead and that the response 
of the unemployment rate, inflation, 
and the short-term interest rate are 
different enough from zero and explain 
enough of the variance of the series 
that we can be pretty confident that it 
is not a statistical fluke.5
 
THE PIGOU CYCLE
We have seen some of the 
empirical evidence that suggests 
that changes in expectations about 
the future can alter aggregate 
economic outcomes today. That is, 
news about the future seems to be a 
significant driver of current economic 
fluctuations. What does economic 
theory have to say about how we might 
interpret the statistical evidence?
In the early 1900s, A.C. Pigou 
wrote: “The varying expectations 
of businessmen ... constitute the 
immediate cause and direct causes or 
antecedents of industrial fluctuations.” 
In other words, Pigou believed that 
changes in expectations about the 
future were a principal cause of 
business cycles in the economy. 
If people were optimistic about 
the future, current consumption, 
investment, and output would rise. If 
they were overly optimistic, once they 
realized that their expectations were 
too rosy, the economy would go into 
recession as businesses and households 
pulled back on their spending.  A 
Pigou cycle then can arise when 
output, consumption, investment, 
and hours worked jointly increase 
in response to an anticipated rise in 
productivity.  When the anticipated 
increase fails to materialize, a recession 
ensues. 
This view of booms and busts 
seems consistent with the way 
events unfolded during the dot-
com bubble. Expectations about 
higher future productivity driven 
by Internet-related technologies led 
to an investment boom in products 
such as fiber-optic cable. The stock 
market value of technology stocks 
rose to unprecedented highs. The 
rationalization for such high valuations 
was that the economy was entering 
a new era of high productivity that 
should be reflected in future stock 
earnings and dividends. After the 
fact, these expectations turned out to 
be overly optimistic, and the dot-com 
bust dovetailed into the recession that 
began in 2001.
Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that people receive and process news 
about the future and that such news 
can affect behavior. For example, 
stock prices and consumer confidence 
measures are thought to lead the 
business cycle. We can tell stories that 
seem consistent with the Pigou cycle 
theory of booms and busts. However, 
it turns out that this view of the world 
does not work particularly well in the 
standard workhorse model of modern 
macroeconomics.6 In fact, in the 
standard model, good news about the 
future in the form of higher expected 
productivity can lead to a drop in 
hours worked, output, and investment 
today. In the standard model, expected 
booms lead to what look a lot like 
recessions today!
To develop some insights into 
why the standard model gives this 
result, consider first a case in which 
households observe an increase in 
current productivity that they expect 
will persist into the future. With 
persistently higher productivity, 
households are wealthier, since their 
current and expected future real 
incomes are higher (for example, real 
wages rise with productivity in the 
standard model). In this case, output, 
employment, consumption, and 
investment all rise today.  
Two forces are at work behind 
this result. The first is a wealth effect. 
Higher productivity means higher real 
income in the standard model.  Thus, 
household wealth increases, and being 
richer induces more consumption 
today, since households like to smooth 
out their consumption over time. 
But higher wealth also means that 
households want to consume more 
leisure; so the wealth effect predicts 
that hours worked will fall. Offsetting 
the impact of the wealth effect on 
work effort is a substitution effect. The 
substitution effect says that households 
5 See also the paper by Robert Barsky and 
Eric Sims. They examine how output and 
consumption respond to innovations using 
responses from the Michigan Survey. They 
also find that changes in people’s expectations 
about the future lead to significant changes in 
current output, consumption, and productivity. 
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe and Martin Uribe 
estimate an equilibrium model with news 
shocks and find that news about the future can 
account for a substantial fraction of economic 
fluctuations.
News about the 
future seems to be 
                    
of current economic 
                  
does economic 
theory have to 
say about how we 
might interpret the 
statistical evidence?
6 By a standard macroeconomic model I am re-
ferring to the neoclassical growth model.  That 
model is one of a representative household that 
maximizes its consumption and leisure, subject 
to the constraint that consumption and invest-
ment are no greater than what can be produced 
with capital on hand and labor effort. For a very 
accessible discussion of the neoclassical growth 
model, see the Business Review article by Satyajit 
Chatterjee. 28   Q4  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
work harder when productivity is 
higher and then invest the proceeds 
to attain higher consumption in the 
future when productivity is lower. 
Thus, the substitution effect indicates 
that in response to higher productivity 
today, households work harder, 
consume less, and save more.
Which effect is dominant: wealth 
or substitution? It depends first on how 
persistent the increase in productivity 
is expected to be. The more persistent 
the rise in productivity, the stronger 
the wealth effect. Also important 
is how responsive labor supply is to 
changes in the real wage. If labor 
supply increases a lot in response to 
an increase in wages, the substitution 
effect becomes stronger. Figure 3 shows 
how consumption, investment, output, 
and hours worked respond in the 
standard model to a productivity shock 
calibrated in the standard way — a 
fairly persistent shock. We see that for 
labor supply, the substitution effect 
dominates the wealth effect and hours 
worked increase. In addition, output, 
consumption, and investment all rise 
in response to a positive productivity 
shock.
Consider now what the model 
predicts if the productivity shock is 
expected to affect the economy in 
the future but not directly today. In 
anticipation of higher real wages in the 
future, households feel wealthier today 
and so spend more on consumption 
and leisure. Because the productivity 
shock hits in the future, there is not 
a strong substitution effect today. 
(Households are not more productive 
today; they only expect to be in the 
future.) Consequently, households have 
little incentive to work harder today, 
since they are no more productive 
than before. Thus, in response to 
higher expected future productivity, 
current consumption rises and hours 
worked fall. With lower hours worked, 
output falls. Since output falls and 
consumption rises, investment must 
fall, since output equals consumption 
plus investment (we are ignoring 
net exports). Thus, an expected 
Standard Model: Response to a Positive Productivity Shock
FIGURE 3
Panels show the response of consumption, investment, output, and hours to a percent increase in the productivity shock at time 1.
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boom in productivity leads to lower 
output and hours worked today (but 
higher consumption). This intuition 
is revealed in the impulse responses 
shown in Figure 4. Here, we show the 
response of consumption, investment, 
hours worked, and output to a shock 
that signals that productivity will rise 
one year from now. 
So it seems that the standard 
model does not deliver a result about 
the effect of news on the economy that 
agrees with the empirical evidence 
we presented earlier. Remember, that 
evidence suggested that in response 
to good news about the future 
economy, there is a boom today, with 
consumption, output, and investment 
all increasing. Is there a model whose 
predictions agree with that evidence?
It turns out that a modified 
version of the standard model 
can predict a boom in response to 
expectations of good times in the 
future. The standard model has to be 
modified so that the wealth effect on 
labor supply is not strong. In addition, 
various other frictions must be added 
to the model so that both consumption 
and investment respond positively to 
good news about the future. These 
modifications are detailed in a recent 
paper by Nir Jaimovich and Sergio 
Rebelo. They allow firms to vary 
the intensity with which they use 
capital, which is important because 
it increases the extent to which 
output can respond to news about 
the future. They also assume that 
it is costly for firms to adjust their 
stock of capital, which gives firms an 
incentive to respond immediately to 
future productivity changes in order to 
smooth out costs over time.  
 A somewhat different approach 
is taken in a recent paper by Wouter 
den Haan and Georg Kaltenbrunner. 
They postulate that in order to 
benefit from future productivity 
gains, firms and households have to 
invest resources today. In den Haan 
Standard Model: Response to News Today That Productivity Will
Increase in Four Quarters
FIGURE 4
Panels show the response of consumption, investment, output, and hours to a 0.01 percent increase in the productivity shock at time 1 that is 
realized at time t=4.
Consumption Response
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7 Bernanke and Gertler actually argue for a re-
gime of flexible inflation targeting, which, they 
contend, has three characteristics. The first is 
that monetary policy is committed to attaining 
a target level of inflation in the long run and 
price stability is the overriding goal of monetary 
policy. Second, within the constraints imposed 
by achieving a long-run inflation target, policy-
makers have some flexibility in the short run to 
achieve other objectives, such as stable output 
and employment. Third, there is a commitment 
to transparency and openness on the part of 
monetary policymakers so that private-sector 
expectations about policy and the economy are 
well grounded. 
and Kaltenbrunner’s model, firms 
and workers that are not already 
engaged in production when news 
about higher future productivity is 
revealed need to get together today 
and form productive relationships. 
Since building productive relationships 
requires both time and resources, 
firms start investing in new projects 
right away and immediately begin 
looking for new workers with whom to 
build productive relationships. Thus, 
employment, investment, and output 
rise in response to expectations of 
higher future productivity growth in 
their model. 
So we see that there are several 
reasonable approaches we might take 
in order to get a coherent theoretical 
model of the economy that has the 
feature that expectations of good 
times in the future lead to booms 
today. Discriminating among these 
alternative modeling strategies is only 
at the earliest stages in the economics 
profession. Time will tell which 
modeling strategy most closely aligns 
with the regularities found in the data. 
EXPECTATIONS, BUSINESS 
CYCLES, AND MONETARY 
POLICY 
If economic variables such as 
stock prices, output, employment, 
consumption, and investment 
do respond in a meaningful and 
important way to expectations about 
the future, what are the implications 
for policymakers? Recently, the 
economy has experienced an unusual 
amount of asset-price volatility 
whose source can perhaps ultimately 
be traced to overly optimistic 
expectations about continued increases 
in house prices. When house prices 
began falling instead of rising, financial 
markets began to perform badly, and 
a downturn in real economic activity 
ensued. This episode is not unique.  
Over the past 20 years or so, several 
boom-bust cycles have unfolded 
around the world, including Japan in 
the late 1980s and East Asia in the late 
1990s. These episodes have generated 
debate about the importance of the 
role played by monetary policy in 
booms and busts: Often the episodes 
were accompanied by heightened 
criticism of central banks for fueling 
the booms by keeping monetary policy 
too easy for too long. 
Asset-price run-ups and asset-price 
volatility seem to be key features of 
expectations-driven booms in practice. 
This raises a question about the extent 
to which monetary policymakers 
should take asset prices into account 
when setting policy. Unfortunately, 
it is difficult to determine the extent 
to which asset prices are aligned with 
“true fundamentals” or are being 
driven by nonfundamental factors. 
For monetary policymakers who are 
concerned with stabilizing inflation 
and employment growth, determining 
the “right” level of asset prices seems 
a tall order. However, it may be the 
case that by focusing on stabilizing 
inflation and employment growth, 
policymakers can stabilize asset prices 
as a byproduct.  This is the message 
of a study by Ben Bernanke and Mark 
Gertler.  
Consider the case of a central 
bank that operates monetary policy 
in such a way as to try to achieve an 
inflation target. That is, the central 
bank’s mandate is to keep inflation 
close to some level — say, 2 percent 
— over a suitably defined length of 
time. There is some reason to expect 
that such a monetary policy will act as 
a natural stabilizing force with respect 
to boom-bust cycles. The inflation-
targeting approach to monetary 
policy dictates that monetary policy 
should be adjusted to offset emerging 
inflationary or deflationary pressures.7 
Bernanke and Gertler argue that by 
focusing on inflation, central banks 
in effect respond to the bad effects of 
booms and busts without having to 
take an explicit stand on whether asset 
prices are valued fairly (according to 
economic fundamentals) in booms. For 
purposes of the ensuing discussion, we 
will say that, in a boom, asset prices 
are rising, an assumption that agrees 
with most definitions of booms in the 
data.  
How can inflation targeting end 
up “getting it right” with respect to 
policy and expectations-driven cycles? 
Recently, the economy has experienced 
an unusual amount of asset-price volatility 
whose source can perhaps ultimately be 
traced to overly optimistic expectations 
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Bernanke and Gertler argue that 
inflation targeting leads policymakers 
to automatically adjust interest rates in 
such a way as to stabilize the economy 
in the face of booms. The idea is that 
booms are associated with increases 
in demand; that is, consumption, 
investment, and ultimately output 
rise. In Bernanke and Gertler’s view, 
increases in demand are in turn 
associated with rising inflation. But an 
inflation-targeting central bank will 
raise the interest rate in response to 
rising inflation. In effect, the central 
bank leans against the wind. This 
reins in the increase in demand and 
stabilizes financial markets as well.
Financial markets are likely to 
stabilize for several reasons. The first 
is that the stability of the broader 
economy is, in itself, stabilizing for 
financial markets. Second, suppose the 
economy starts to go into recession and 
asset prices start to decline — which 
will tend to erode the balance sheets 
of banks (and other firms, as well). 
The falloff in demand and declining 
inflation call for policymakers to lower 
the interest rate, which can reduce 
the economy’s vulnerability to further 
bad shocks. Finally, if financial market 
participants expect policymakers to 
act in this way, it may mean that the 
overreaction of asset prices might 
be moderated.  Overreaction could 
occur if asset prices are in part driven 
by a market psychology or some 
other factor, such as poor regulatory 
practices, not directly fundamental to 
determining asset prices.
Bernanke and Gertler’s paper 
is really about monetary policy and 
asset-price volatility. They note that 
financial stability is becoming an 
increasing concern for monetary 
policymakers because, over the past 
25 years, a number of countries have 
experienced major boom-bust cycles 
in the prices of assets such as equities 
and real estate. Associated with the 
bust part of the cycles, as asset prices 
are falling, real economic activity 
is declining significantly. We have 
presented evidence that changes in 
expectations that can influence real 
activity also show up in asset prices, 
such as stock prices. So expectations-
driven cycles fit naturally into the 
asset-price boom-bust cycles with 
which Bernanke and Gertler are 
concerned. 
In the Pigou cycles story, the bust 
part of the cycle comes about when 
overly optimistic expectations are not 
realized and firms and households 
cut back on their consumption and 
spending.  Bernanke and Gertler 
point out another negative force at 
work in the bust part of the cycle: 
negative balance-sheet effects on 
firms and households from declines 
in asset prices.  This channel can be 
important because credit markets 
are characterized by problems such 
as differential information between 
parties to a contract, problems of 
contract enforcement, and misaligned 
incentives between lenders and 
borrowers, or managers and investors. 
Because these problems exist, credit is 
most widely available and on the best 
terms to institutions and households 
that have strong balance sheets (i.e., 
are in good financial shape with 
respect to their assets and liabilities). 
So balance-sheet conditions become 
important determinants of borrowing 
and lending. But falling asset prices 
can have an adverse impact on balance 
sheets because firms and households 
may use the assets they own as 
collateral for borrowing. If asset prices 
fall, the amount of collateral falls, 
which raises the ratio of borrowing 
relative to assets, worsens balance-
sheet positions, and makes it harder to 
borrow. In turn, the reduced borrowing 
lowers demand in the economy and 
may also adversely affect supply by 
reducing working capital for firms and 
inhibiting investment. These factors 
work to further slow down economic 
activity and worsen economic 
downturns. 
Thus, it can be quite important for 
monetary policymakers to recognize 
the downside of an expectations-
driven boom-bust cycle. If there 
is a significant decline in asset 
prices, households and firms face 
greater difficulty in financing their 
consumption and investment decisions, 
which lowers aggregate demand and 
can make economic downturns more 
severe.  The good news is that in the 
Bernanke and Gertler story, central 
banks can help alleviate these policies 
not by focusing policy on movements 
in asset prices but rather by focusing 
on inflation.  Asset prices stabilize as a 
consequence. 
However, there may be 
circumstances in which inflation 
targeting does not lead to a good 
outcome in the face of asset booms. 
Lawrence Christiano, Roberto Motto, 
and Massimo Rostagno make this 
point in their paper. They look at 
asset price swings since the 1870s and 
argue that there were three significant 
boom-bust episodes: one that began 
in 1920 and ended with the Great 
Depression, one that began in the 
mid 1950s and ended in the 1970s, 
If asset prices 
fall, the amount of 
collateral falls, which 
raises the ratio of 
borrowing relative 
to assets, worsens 
balance-sheet 
positions, and makes 
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and one that began in the mid 1990s 
and ended in the early 2000s. Their 
model includes inflation-targeting 
monetary policymakers in an economy 
with sticky wages and prices as well 
as adjustment costs to investment.8 
In that environment, boom-bust 
cycles can easily arise. A feature that 
distinguishes their paper is sticky 
wages, which means that nominal 
wages are not fully flexible in response 
to the shocks hitting the economy, but 
rather take time to adjust to the new 
equilibrium level. Some researchers 
have argued that this feature of the 
model is important for matching 
certain features of the data on the 
economy.9
Suppose then that nominal wages 
are sticky.  How does this cause a 
problem for an inflation-targeting 
central bank? When the boom phase 
starts, it is typical in macroeconomic 
models for real wages (defined as the 
nominal wage divided by a general 
price index) to rise to induce people to 
work harder. But with sticky nominal 
wages, the only way that happens is 
if prices start to fall. An inflation-
targeting policymaker sees the drop in 
inflation and so eases monetary policy 
by reducing interest rates in order to 
stimulate demand and push inflation 
back up to the target level. But this 
stimulative action ends up feeding the 
already-present optimism about the 
economy and generates even faster 
growth of consumption, investment, 
and output. Monetary policy ends up 
making the boom even bigger, and the 
eventual bust, worse.
8 Sticky prices are prices that are slow to 
respond to changes in supply or demand. Simi-
larly, sticky wages are wage levels that are slow 
to respond to changes in the labor market.  
9 See the paper by Lawrence Christiano, Martin 
Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans for a more 
detailed discussion of model features that lead 
to a better match with the data. 
                             
FIGURE 5
Each variable is normalized to 1 in 1947Q2. The chart shows 100 times the log of the resulting 
series.
If inflation targeting is counter-
productive in this environment, what 
should a monetary policymaker do? 
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 
argue that policymakers also need to 
monitor credit market conditions as 
well as inflation because credit growth 
is correlated with booms. Consequent-
ly, if policymakers observe strong credit 
growth and declining inflation, they 
should still “lean against the wind” 
and raise interest rates to slow the 
economy and temper the boom.    
Bernanke and Gertler and 
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno have 
different takes on whether inflation 
targeting helps stabilize an economy 
that experiences a boom. The key 
difference between the conflicting 
accounts is how inflation behaves 
during the boom phase of the cycle. 
If inflation rises in the boom phase, 
Bernanke and Gertler’s stabilization 
argument holds and inflation targeting 
will be stabilizing for the economy. If 
inflation falls during the boom phase, 
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno’s 
argument holds and inflation-
targeting policy is destabilizing for 
the economy. Unfortunately, the 
data do not give a clear-cut answer 
about the relationship between stock 
market booms and inflation. The big 
problem is defining what constitutes 
a boom in asset prices: There is no 
completely objective measure. Figure 
5 plots the log of the S&P 500 index 
in both nominal and real terms and 
the rate of inflation measured by the 
personal consumption expenditures 
(PCE) index.10 Clearly, the correlation 
between inflation and asset-price 
10 Since the index is plotted in logs, a change in 
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booms depends in part on how booms 
are identified.  For example, we might 
try to define a boom as above-trend 
growth in the stock market index. But 
then we would have to decide how 
to measure trend growth in the stock 
price index.  Deviations from a linear 
trend look different than deviations 
from a trend that varies smoothly over 
time or a linear trend that has breaks 
in it.  
For a more general look at the 
data, we can go back to Figure 2. Here 
we have not defined booms or busts 
but instead relied only on the postwar 
data (although we have also made 
some identification assumptions as 
detailed above). The figure shows that 
in response to higher expectations of 
future unemployment, stock prices 
decline and inflation declines. Flipping 
that around, we can say that when 
expectations for the future economy 
are unusually good, stock prices rise 
as does inflation.  At least over the 
postwar period, the response of asset 
prices and inflation seems to line up 
better with the view in Bernanke and 
Gertler. Indeed, Figure 2 also shows 
that the Federal Reserve tended to 
tighten policy in booms and ease 
policy in bad times. That is not to say, 
though, that the Christiano, Motto, 
and Rostagno story is without merit.  
It is hard to argue against the view 
that monetary policymakers would 
be well served by monitoring credit 
market conditions as well as inflation 
in setting policy.  Indeed, the Federal 
Reserve looks at a broad array of 
indicators when making decisions 
about the appropriate stance of 
monetary policy, even if low and stable 
inflation is a principal goal of policy. 
SUMMARY
Expectations play an important 
role in decision-making at the 
individual level, and there is increasing 
evidence that expectations about the 
future are important in accounting for 
fluctuations in economic aggregates. 
New economic models are attempting 
to explicitly model the expectations 
channel for business cycles. With the 
recent housing-related boom and bust 
in the U.S. and its manifestations 
across the globe, it seems even more 
important that macroeconomists 
develop models that can help us 
understand this episode and guide 
monetary policymakers in their 
decision-making.  B R
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